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An imperfectly competitive economy is very prone to market uncertainty,  including uncertainty 
about the liquidity (or "thickness") of markets.  We show, in particular, that there exist stochastic 
equilibrium outcomes in nonstochastic market games if (and only if) the endowments are not Pareto 
optimal.  We  also  provide  a  link  between  extrinsic  uncertainty arising  in  games  (e.g.  correlated 
equilibria) and  extrinsic  uncertainty in  market economies  (e.g.  sunspot equilibria).  A  correlated 
equilibria to the market game is either a sunspot  equilibrium or a non-sunspot  equilibrium to the 
related securities games, but the converse is not true in general. 
1.  INTRODUCTION  AND  SUMMARY 
The usual general equilibrium model can be used to explain how randomness in endow- 
ments, preferences, and technology is transmitted  through the economy to make economic 
outcomes  random.  This is not the only source of economic  volatility.  Some economic 
uncertainty is  generated  by the  market process  itself.  We refer to  this  other type  of 
economic uncertainty as market  uncertainty. The "sunspot-equilibrium" notion introduced 
by Cass and Shell (see Shell (1977) and Cass and Shell (1983)) provides a formal theory 
of market uncertainty. From the sunspots literature, we know that in rational-expectations 
models  the competitive-equilibrium allocation  of resources can be random, even if the 
economic  fundamentals are immune from random disturbances. 
In the present paper, we extend the formal analysis of market  uncertainty to economies 
in which  competition  is not perfect.  The scope  of the effects of  market uncertainty is 
richer and of greater policy interest in the non-competitive environment.  In this environ- 
ment, economic actors are uncertain as to whether markets will be thick or thin (i.e. liquid 
or illiquid),  or even whether these markets will be open or closed.  An economic  actor 
must forecast the behaviour of  the other economic  actors in order to  forecast market 
liquidity.  A wide  range of  beliefs  about market liquidity is rational.  If, for example, 
demand in a particular market (or overall) is weak, then in response, supply is weak. 
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We build on the familiar market game of Shapley and Shubik (e.g. Shubik (1973), 
Shapley and Shubik (1977),  Shapley (1976),  Mas-Colell  (1982),  Peck and Shell (1985), 
and Peck, Shell , and Spear (1989)).  The market-game  model provides the common stage' 
for comparing two leading equilibrium concepts in which extrinsic uncertainty plays an 
important role:  (a)  sunspot  equilibrium (which  was  first developed  in the  context  of 
competitive market economies), and (b) correlated equilibrium (which was first  developed 
in the context of matrix games).2 
In our formal analysis, we follow the "sunspots" tradition in assuming that uncertainty 
is purely extrinsic,3  but we invite the reader to imagine at times that this represents the 
polar case of  intrinsic uncertainty with relatively small effects on the fundamentals and 
relatively  large  effects  on  economic  outcomes.4  We  formally  follow  the  "sunspots" 
tradition in assuming that market uncertainty is exogenous to the economy, i.e. that it is 
adopted from outside the economy  and serves to coordinate the plans of the individual 
market participants.  In some  cases, however, it may be possible  to dispense  with this 
assumption  and  then  the  market uncertainty could  be  considered  endogenous to  the 
economy. 
In Section 2, we present the (certainty) market game r.  We also present some results 
about  pure-strategy Nash  equilibrium in  r,  which  results are used  in the  succeeding 
sections.  In  Section  3,  we  apply the  notion  of  correlated equilibrium to  the game r. 
Strategies are based on an extrinsic, exogenous  randomizing device which is outside the 
rules of r.  Asymmetric information is permitted. 
In  Section  3, we  also  discuss  the importance of  Aumann's  (1987)  equivalence  of 
correlated equilibrium and Bayes-rational equilibrium in the context of market games. 
In the Bayes-rational-equilibrium model, the only uncertainty that a consumer faces is 
uncertainty about what moves the other consumers will actually make.  This uncertainty 
is obviously extrinsic.  It might also be considered to be endogenous  in the sense that an 
exogenous  device generating the correlated signals need not be identified.  A consumer 
might know how he gets his signal from the economic, physical, and cultural environment, 
and he might know how his signal is correlated with the actions of others, even though 
he does not know the source of the signals of the others. 
If uncertainty is exogenous,  it can be observed and hence be incorporated into the 
rules of the game.  As part of the rules of the game, it is natural to include markets which 
permit hedging of risks across the states of nature (as is done in competitive equilibrium 
models:  see Arrow (1964)  and Cass and Shell (1983)).  The existence  of these markets 
can alter the set of equilibrium allocations.  In Section 4, we define the securities game 
r(P),  an extension  of the game F to allow for transfer of incomes  across the extrinsic 
states  of  nature  over  which  the  randomizing  device  P  is  defined.  Every correlated 
equilibrium allocation to the market game r based on the randomizing device P is also 
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium allocation to the securities game I(P).  We also show 
in Section 4 that proper sunspot equilibria in the securities game are not flukes: if and 
only if endowments are not Pareto optimal in r,  there is a P so that the securities game 
r(P)  has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is affected 
1. See  Peck and  Shell  (1985)  for the  earliest such  work.  We had  to  choose  a  concrete  example  for 
comparison of  sunspot equilibrium and correlated equilibrium.  The market game is probably the best stage 
for our analysis,  but our basic  results  should  also  apply  to  other general-equilibrium models  of  imperfect 
competition. 
2.  See (a)  Shell (1977) and Cass and Shell (1983), and (b) Aumann (1974,1987). 
3.  For the definitions of intrinsic uncertainty and extrinsic uncertainty, see Cass and Shell (1983), Section 
II, p. 196. 
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by the outcome of the randomization device P. Hence the existence of sunspot equilibrium 
is  generic.  (Nonsunspot  equilibria,  however,  always  exist:  for  every r(P),  there is  a 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the randomization does not affect the allocation.) 
In Section 5, we provide two examples of equilibria which are not mere randomiz- 
ations over pure-strategy Nash equilibria to r.  The first example is based on the transfer 
of  incomes  across  states  of  nature.  It  establishes  that  not  every  pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium to r(P)  can be achieved as a correlated equilibrium to r.  That is, at least 
for some market games the set of correlated equilibrium allocations is a proper subset of 
the  pure-strategy Nash  equilibria to  the  corresponding  securities  games.  The  second 
example is driven by asymmetric information.  We display a correlated equilibrium to a 
market game.  The equilibrium allocation  is neither a randomization over pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium allocations  nor is it a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium allocation. 
In Section 6, we conclude with remarks about replication of the market and securities 
games to achieve "large economy" results.  We relate our limiting symmetric-information 
solutions to competitive equilibrium in economies  with incomplete markets. We contrast 
our limiting asymmetric-information solutions to competitive-equilibrium outcomes. 
2.  PURE  CERTAINTY:  THE  MARKET  GAME  r 
There are I consumption goods and inside money.  There are n consumers.  Consumer h 
is endowed with a positive amount of commodity  i, (wi,, for i = 1, . . .  l  If we denote by 
coh  the endowment vector (to.  .  . .,  a,. .  . .,  (),  then we have  Wh  E  ' 
I  for h =1,...,  n. 
For  each  commodity,  there  is  a  single  trading post  on  which  the  commodity  is 
exchanged for money.  Consumer h supplies a non-negative quantity of commodity i, qh, 
at trading post i.  He also supplies a non-negative quantity of money, b,,  at trading post 
i.  We say that  qh  is  his  offer (of  commodity  i)  and that  b'  is  his  (money)  bid  (for 
commodity  i).  Let  bh=(b',...,bX,...,b'h)  and  qh=  (q*,  qh,.  I qh  denote 
(respectively)  his  bids and  his  offers. Offers must be made in terms of  physical  com- 
modities.  Hence offers cannot exceed endowments, i.e. we have qh C-=  for i =  1,...,  l. 
The strategy set Sh  of consumer h is then given by Sh-  {(bh,  qh)  E  I|  qh-  h}- 
The trading process is simple.  The total amount of commodity  i which is offered, 
Ek=1  q',  is allocated to consumers in proportion to their shares of the bids for commodity 
i.  Consumer h's share of the bids at post  i is (bX/Zk_n  bk).  Thus the gross receipts of 
commodity  i  for  consumer  h  are  [(bh)/(k=  bk)I(k=I  qk)  for  i = 1, . . ., l  and  h= 
1,...,  n.  Similarly, consumer  h's share of the offers at post  i is (q,/  k=ih  qk),  and his 
gross receipts of  money  from post  i are [(qX)/(3_ii  qk)](i-i  bk)  for  i I= 1,...,  l and 
h =  1,...,  n.5 Each consumer faces a single overall budget constraint which he must meet 
or be punished.  He is required to finance his bids  (for commodities)  by his offers (of 
commodities).  The budget constraint for consumer h is 
z~:~  {(q{/~?~  q{)  bJ  b  i},Ej 
- 
bJ,  (2.1)  j1J-I{(  q h/ Ek=_  q k)  E  k _1  bk }  J_tbh,  (. 
for h=l,...,  n. 
Let  x'  denote  the  consumption  of  commodity  i  by  consumer  h,  and  let  xh= 
(xI,  . . .,  xx,  . . .,  X)  be  his  consumption  vector.  Assume  that  consumer  k  chooses  the 
5.  It is assumed that (1) if there are no bids on a post, offers on this post are confiscated and (2) if there 
are no offers on the post, bids are confiscated.  This rule is simply expressed by the convention 0/0 = 0  in the 
systems (2.1) and (2.2) below. 1014  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
strategy (bk,  qk)  E 2!  for k = 1,...,  n; then the consumption  of consumer h is given by 
Xh  =h-qi+[  (bh)/k  k  b'k)  ](:k-1  qk)  if  (2.1)  is  satisfied 
and  (2.2) 
h=0  if (2.1) is not satisfied 
for i = 1,..  .,  l and h =  1, .. .,  n. (Failure to meet budget constraint (2.1) leads to confisca- 
tion of all the consumer's goods.) 
The consumption  set of consumer  h is the nonnegative  orthant  {Xh I  Xh  }.  His 
utility function,  Uh,  is  strictly increasing,  smooth,  and  strictly concave  on  the  strictly 
positive orthant R '+.  Also, the closure in  RX  of each indifference surface from R4 +  is 
contained in R  +.  (This last assumption allows us to avoid some boundary solutions.) 
The boundary of the consumption set, (R4 \ R  +), is also the indifference surface of least 
utility. 
We have specified  strategy sets Sh, the  outcomes Xh  (through Equation (2.2)),  and 
the payoffs Uh (Xh)  for the market game r.  Let  ah  =  (bh,  qh)  be a strategy in  Sh.  Define 
the  set  S  by  S=S1x  .  .  . Sh  x  .  . . x Sn  c  (R21)n.  Define  the  strategy vector by  o E S  by 
0? =  (Oh.,  I  .  h,...  ,  ?n).  From Equation  (2.2),  we  see that x,  is a function  of the b's 
and q's so that the outcome can be written as a function of the strategies a-,  namely xi,  (a) 
for h = 1, ..  .,  n and x(a)  = (xl(r),  . ..  ,  xh(),  ...  , xn(or)).  We adopt  the standard  concept 
of (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium. 
The game r  exhibits individual rationality, since the trivial strategy o-h =  (bh,  qh)  = 
(0, 0) is in  Sh.  Furthermore, if every consumer plays the trivial strategy, this is a Nash 
equilibrium. The corresponding allocation is autarky. Next we provide formal definitions 
of a closed market and an open market. 
Definition 2.3.  Let (r= ((bl,  ql), . . .,  (bh, qh), ...,(bn,  qn))  be  a Nash  equilibrium 
vector of strategies in the market game F. We say that market i is closed (resp. open) if 
k=1  b' =0  (resp. >._l  b  > 0).  It follows  immediately  that market i  is  closed  (resp. 
open)  if  and  only  if  3ki  qk  =  0  (resp.  qk  >  0). 
Next we define an interior Nash equilibrium strategy vector and then we report its 
basic existence and welfare properties. 
Definition  2.4.  The  strategy  -  =I{(bh,  q)}hh=1  eS  is  said  to  be  an  interior  Nash 
equilibrium  to the market game r if a is a Nash equilibrium for r and or  is strictly positive, 
i.e.  o  +  + I so  that  each  of  the  1 markets  is  open.  The  corresponding  allocation 
X(U) E RYIn is called an interior Nash equilibrium  allocation of r. 
Proposition 2.5.  An interior Nash equilibrium  allocation of r is autarkic if and only 
if the endowment vector w is Pareto optimal.  Furthermore, if w is not Pareto optimal, an 
interior Nash  equilibrium allocation of  r, X =  (X1,...  I Xh,  ...  , Xn),  must satisfy Uh(Xh)  - 
uh  (Wh),  with strict  inequality  for  at  least  one  h, h =  1,.  ..  n. 
Proof  See  Peck and  Shell  (1985,  Proposition  (2.20))  and Peck, Shell, and Spear 
(1989, Proposition (2.9)).  11 
Next  we cite a central result for pure strategy Nash  equilibrium in market games. 
This result will be used to establish that generically market games possess  equilibra in 
which the strategies and outcomes  are affected by extrinsic uncertainty. PECK  & SHELL  MARKET  UNCERTAINTY  1015 
Proposition  2.6.  There  is  always  an  interior  Nash  equilibrium strategy  o= 
{(bh,  qh)}h==n  E Sfor  the market game r. 
Proof.  See  the  proof  of  Proposition  (2.23),  pp. 18-31  in  Peck and  Shell  (1985). 
(Also see the proof of Theorem (4.10) in Peck, Shell, and Spear (1989)).  11 
In  strategy space,  there are  ln dimensions  of  indeterminacy to  the interior pure- 
strategy Nash  equilibria  for  the  market game  r.  (See  Peck,  Shell,  and  Spear (1989, 
Proposition (2.12)).)  It is natural then to take the vector of offers (and its components) 
as measuring "market thickness", "market confidence", or even "market liquidity". Large 
q's imply that markets are thick, allowing the potential for large net trades.  In this sense, 
markets are liquid.  Large q's also signify that market participants are confident in that 
sellers expect buyers to materialize for what they are offering.  On the other hand, small 
q's mean that markets are thin with (at most) small net trades.  In this sense, markets are 
illiquid.  With small q's, we can think that participants lack confidence in the sense that 
it is expected that effective demand for commodities  will be weak. 
This section contains the analysis of (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium to the simple 
market game r.  In succeeding  sections,  we expand the analysis to allow for the effects 
of extrinsic uncertainty.  First, we extend the solution  concept to correlated equilibrium, 
but  do  not  alter the  game.  Later, we  extend  the game  by  adding  sunspot-contingent 
markets, but use the simple solution concept of (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium.  Then 
we relate the results from the analysis of the more complicated solution concept applied 
to  the simple  game with the  results from the  analysis  of  the simpler solution  concept 
applied to the more complicated  game. 
3.  EXTRINSIC  UNCERTAINTY:  CORRELATED  EQUILIBRIUM  IN  THE 
MARKET  GAME 
The  game  F is  unchanged,  but  a  more  general  solution  concept  is  analyzed.  Purely 
extrinsic uncertainty is introduced.  The fundamentals of the economy-here  tastes and 
endowments-are  unaffected by the random variable; think of it as the level of "sunspot 
activity". The set of states of nature is fl = {1, . . .,  s, . . .,  r}. In observing sunspot activity, 
consumers receive differing and possibly imperfect signals about the true state. The events 
which consumer h can observe are described by Ih, a partition of QI. After receiving his 
signal,  consumer  h knows  in which  element  of  Ih  the true state lies.  Because  of  this 
restriction on his information, consumer h's actions must be "measurable" with respect 
to  Ih.  Define  the information structure I  to be the join  of the consumers' information 
partitions.  Assume  that  prior probability  beliefs  are commonly  held  by  each  of  the 
consumers.  Let Tr(s), s=  1,...,  r, be the probability of the occurrence of state s with 
0<IT(s)<1  and  _  ir(s)=1.  Define  the  vector  of  probabilities  rr  R r  by  ir= 
{ Tr(s)}S_l  .  The probability space P is then defined by P = (f,  iT, I). 
Let  -'(s)E -++  be  consumer  h's  consumption  of  commodity  i  if  state s  occurs. 
Define  Xh()G  ++  XhRr++,  and  xER+rn+ by  Xh(s)={Xh(s)}l  =,  xh{xh(S)}s=l,  and 
=  {Xh}  h1.  Consumer h is assumed to have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
Vh  defined  by  Vh(Xh)  .Es  =(s)uh(rh(s)),  where  Uh : Y  Y  is  the  utility  function 
described in Section 2. 
See  Aumann  (1974,1987)  for the  definitions  of  correlated strategy and  correlated 
equilibrium. Assume that consumer h plays the strategy J  (S)  E Sh  if state s occurs and 
the  strategy  Jh (s')  E Sh  if  the  state  s'  occurs.  (The  symbol  s  indexes  strategies and 1016  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
allocations, just as the superscript i and the subscript h index these variables.)  If s and 
s' are signals which fall in the same element of  Ih,  then the measurability assumption 
entails ji, (s) =  Jh(s'): if consumer h cannot distinguish between the two states, then his 
actions must be the same in the two states.  In what follows, we record some of the basic 
properties of correlated equilibrium for the market game r. 
Remark 3.1.  (1)  A correlated equilibrium for the market game r is individually 
rational.  (2) A (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium to the market game r is also a correlated 
equilibrium  to  F.  (3)  A  mixed-strategy  Nash  equilibrium  to  F is  also  a  correlated 
equilibrium to  F, where the  Ih  are chosen  appropriately, i.e.  to  maintain  "stochastic 
independence"  of the strategies o*h,  h =  1, .. .,  n. (4) A randomization over pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria to r is also a correlated equilibrium to F, where the Ih  are chosen to be 
the same for each consumer. 
There is another formal way to look at correlated equilibrium.  We can replace the 
market game r  with a related two-stage extensive  form game, F(P),  in which the now 
exogenous probability space P is incorporated into the rules of play.  Nature is assumed 
to  choose  the  state  s = 1,...,  r  and  consumers  learn the  elements  in  their partitions 
corresponding to the occurrence of state s,. In the second stage, each consumer chooses 
a spot-market strategy based  on  his  own  information.  We spell  out the isomorphism 
between F and r(P)  in what follows. 
Remark 3.2.  (1) A pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium allocation x e RiZ  for the new 
game  F(P)  is also a correlated-equilibrium allocation  for the market game F.  (2) Con- 
versely, a correlated-equilibrium allocation to the market game r is also a pure-strategy 
Nash-equilibrium allocation for the game F(P)  for some appropriately chosen probability 
space P. 
In Remark (3.2), we describe the equivalence of correlated equilibrium allocations 
to the market game F with pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium allocations to the new game 
F(P).  But do things stop here?  What about correlated equilibrium allocations to the new 
game r(P)?  It turns out that one does not have to consider such complicated  objects, 
because they contain only allocations which are pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solutions 
to  the  game  r(P'),  where  P'  is  a sufficiently rich probability space.  No  complicated 
iteration of this sort is necessary.6 
There is a third and very important interpretation of correlated equilibrium due to 
Aumann (1987).  Assume, as before, that n consumers play the market game F.  The only 
uncertainty is about what action the other players will adopt.  Assume that the probability 
beliefs  of  the  players  can  differ only  because  of  their differing information;  i.e.  it  is 
assumed  that consumers share common  prior probability beliefs.  We call a consumer 
Bayes-rational  if  he  chooses  an  action  that  maximizes  his  expected  utility  given  his 
information.  If it is common  knowledge  that each consumer is Bayes-rational at each 
state of the world, then the distribution of the strategies o-*  is also a correlated equilibrium 
(based on some probability space P) for the market game r.  In this way, we can consider 
the probability space P  as endogenously  generated within the market game.  The space 
P can be thought of as a set of self-fulfilling (or consistent) prophecies. 
6.  There is another potential technical issue which should be recorded.  We assume for ease of analysis 
that the set of states fl  is finite, even though the strategy space  S is infinite.  We see no economic  difficulties, 
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Aumann's  equivalence  between  correlated equilibrium and  Bayes-rational equili- 
brium plays an important role in the analysis of market uncertainty.  While it might be 
difficult to imagine that businessmen focus on an explicit, exogenous  correlating device, 
we readily accept the idea that businessmen, even those who know all the "fundamentals" 
with  certainty, can still  be  uncertain about the  actions  of  others.  This  description  of 
participants reading the economic  environment for their beliefs  about what the others 
will do, and then maximizing, corresponds to the notion of Bayesian rationality.  Since 
the actual mechanism that provides the participants with their "readings" is not known 
by anyone, we think of the market  uncertainty as being generated endogenously.  Aumann's 
(1987) result shows that the formalism of correlated equilibrium can capture this aspect 
of businessmen's behaviour even when no participant can describe the correlating device. 
Aumann's (1987) hypothesis  of common priors includes a fair amount of "correla- 
tion" in the way players form beliefs.  To justify the assumption of common priors, we 
suppose that an actual mechanism (physical, genetic, or cultural) is providing the correla- 
tion.  The actual mechanism or system can be so complicated that no one knows more 
than a small piece  of  it.  The fact that no player can point to the cause of the market 
uncertainty does  not invalidate the correlated-equilibrium (or the sunspot-equilibrium) 
explanation. 
4.  EXTRINSIC  UNCERTAINTY:  PURE-STRATEGY  NASH  EQUILIBRIUM  IN 
THE  SECURITIES  GAME 
We return to the simple  (pure-strategy) Nash-equilibrium concept employed  in Section 
2, but we  complicate  the  market game  in order to  allow  for extrinsic uncertainty.  In 
Section 3, we introduced the game F(P)  in which the probability space P is written into 
the rules.  No  insurance or hedging possibilities  are allowed  for in F(P).  Consumer h 
may have high utility in one state and low utility in another.  Because of the concavity 
of his utility function,  consumer h has a motive to transfer purchasing power from one 
state to another but the rules of F(P)  do not permit such transfers. 
There is an economic need for state-contingent securities.  In what follows, we expand 
the  game  F(P)  to  include  Arrow securities  (or  state-contingent  money).  Spot-market 
trading is the same as described in Section 3.  Also following  Section 3, the n consumers 
are assumed to be expected-utility maximizers. The expanded game is called the securities 
game and is denoted by F(P),  where the probability space P  (described in Section 2) is 
written into the rules. 
Sunspots imperfectly  Exact element in P 
observed: element  revealed; securities 
in  Ih  revealed  redeemed 
-  0  O 
Securities  Spot commodities  Commodities 
trading  traded  consumed 
This is our time line.  Each of the n consumers is alive and active during the entire 
period.  Let  Xh(S)  =  (h(s),  .s.  ,  Xh(s),...  ,  h(s))  E R'++  be  consumer  h's  consumption 
basket if state s  occurs (s = 1, . . .,  r and h = 1, . . .,  n)  and define  Xh =  {xh(S)}s=1  ++ 
and x ={X  h}1  E$I++. 
The securities market is composed  of  r trading posts, one for each state of nature. 
Bids are denominated in "general monetary units", but offers are made in state-specific 
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market, composed  as in Section 2 of  1 posts,  one for each commodity.  Let bh(s)  E  =+ 
and  qh(s)  E  -+  be,  respectively,  the bid  and the  offer of  consumer  h  on  spot  market 
trading post  i given that state of nature s has occurred.  Let br(s)  E  R+  and qhc(s)  E R+ 
be,  respectively,  the  bid  and  the  offer of  consumer  h  on  security  market s.  Define 
bh E R+1+1)  and qh E  l+1)  in the obvious way.  Define the strategy vectors oh  =  (bh,  qh) 
and a=  (a,.  **,  0h  0.  ,  *an).  Then the strategy set Sh for consumer h in the securities 
game r(P)  is given by 
Sh =  {ah  E 24r(l+1)  bh(s)  and qh(s)  are measurable with respect 
to Ih, and qh(s)Ctoh  fori=1,...,l  and s=1,...,  r}.  (4.1) 
There are two markets: the securities market, which meets before consumers receive 
their private signals,  and  the  spot  commodities  market, which  meets  after consumers 
receive their private signals but before the state s is perfectly revealed.  Consumer h must 
satisfy  two  constraints,  one  for  each  market; if  either  one  or both  are not  satisfied, 
consumer h is punished.  The securities-market constraint is: 
Es-r  b  (s)  -_:i  [q=r  5h)S  i  kI(s)  k  (4.2.i) 
i.e. the sum of the securities-market bids in "general dollars" must be no greater than 
the sum of the revenue in "general dollars" from the sales of  securities.  Purchases of 
securities are-financed by the sales of securities.  A single unit of security s pays one unit 
of account in state s and zero otherwise.  Security s can be thought of as state-s money, 
or state-s  dollars,  dollars  accepted  in  state  s  and  only  in  state  s.  In  order to  avoid 
punishment, consumer h must also meet the commodity-market budget constraint: 
L  _ I  b  (  )-  _ I[  qh (s  )  Icz nk  (s~  )  ]J+  b h  (4S2)  -(4  h  i  hol(4.2.ii) 
for s=1...  r. The consumption , Xh, of consumer h is given by 
AhS 
A 
A)  -  hS)+b(S)  [k 
q k 
if the budget constraints 
and  (4.3) 
xh(s)=O  otherwise 
for i=  1, ...,  l  and s=  1, ...,  r.7 
The game F(P)  can be thought of  as the non-competitive  analogue  of the Arrow 
(1964)  securities  model,  but  in  which  uncertainty is  purely extrinsic.  Hence,  for the 
special  case  of  symmetric information,  our model  can also  be thought  of  as the non- 
competitive analogue  of the particular Cass-Shell  (1983) sunspot model in which there 
are no  restrictions  on  market participation.  The  securities  game  F(P)  is  completely 
specified.  The  strategy  sets  are  Sh  are  defined  in  Equation  (4.1).  The  outcomes 
(Xh(),  ..  .,  xh(r))  are given by Equation (4.3), and the payoffs are the expected utilities 
Vh(Xh)  at probabilities {1r(s)}ls  .  The game F(P)  is individually rational for each of the 
7.  The system of equations (4.3) is consistent with the following  auditing-punishment procedure: Trade 
takes place on the securities market, and if constraint (4.2.i) is violated, consumer h is punished immediately 
no matter which state of nature occurs, i.e.  Xh(S)  =  0 for s = 1, . . .  r. Then the referee audits the consumer's 
spot market plans.  If it is the case that in some state of nature s, consumer h violates constraint (4.2.ii), then 
he is punished on the spot market no matter which state of nature occurs, i.e., Xh(S') = 0 for s' = 1, ...  I r. PECK  & SHELL  MARKET  UNCERTAINTY  1019 
n consumers.  We adopt the standard definition of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium 
to the securities game F(P)  is said to be interior if all bids are strictly positive (including 
those  on the markets for securities) and hence all offers are strictly positive.  Hence,  if 
the equilibrium is interior, all markets are open. 
Definition 4.4.  We say that sunspots do not matter if in the allocation of consumption 
goods,  we  have  Ah(s)  =  Xh(s')  for  h =1,...,n  and  s, s' =  1,...,  r.  Otherwise,  sunspots 
matter. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to F(P) in which the allocation of consumption 
is  independent  (resp. dependent)  on  the  state of  nature is  called  a  non-sunspot Nash 
equilibrium (resp. sunspot Nash equilibrium) to F(P). 
It is easy to display an interior non-sunspot Nash equilibrium to r(P).  This is done 
in the next proposition. 
Proposition 4.5.  The securities game F(P)  has an interior non-sunspot Nash  equili- 
brium. 
Proof  Let o-  = {(bk,  qk)}k=I  e  S  be  an interior Nash  equilibrium of  the  certainty 
game F (analysed  in Section  2).  We know from Proposition  (2.6) that there is such a 
strategy o-. We now construct o5  e S, measurable with respect to the Ih, to be an interior 
non-sunspot  Nash equilibrium to r(P): 
bh(s)  =  bh,  qh(s)=qh,  b'(s)=ir(s)  and  qh'(s)=1  (4.6) 
for  i =  1, ..  ,  1; s =  1, . ..  r;  h=  1, . ..  ,  n. 
No income is being transferred between states if  r defined by Equations (4.6) is the 
strategy vector for P(P).  Hence,  constraint (4.2.i)  holds  with equality.  The constraint 
(4.2.ii)  holds  with equality since  u  is an interior Nash  equilibrium of F.  Since all bids 
and offers are positive, the first-order conditions  for utility maximization under binding 
constraints (4.2) are necessary and sufficient for optimality.  These conditions  are: 
Ah(s)  IT(S)  3Uh(Xh(s))/iXh(s)  Ek?h  bk(s)  [k=l  qk(s) 
-s )  (s')  auh(xh(s  ))/axh(s  )  t#h  (s)  LEkq  bk(s)J 
Y.3k?h  4k(S')  I-lk=l-  KW(s)I2 
x 
- 
'. 
_y=- -( 
.7 
XEko 5h  bks( S  ) 
[L 
1,  =k  W  D)] 
and 
Xh(5  )  Ek?h  LkZ(S)  -k=l  qk (S)  okh  i'(s')  -k=l  :  k (SI)1  =  A  I~~~~~~~~~~ 
for h =1,...,n;  ij=  1,...,  l;  and s, s'=1,  ...,  r; and kh(s)  and Ah(s') are (respectively) 
the Kuhn-Tucker-Lagrange multipliers associated with constraint (4.2.ii) for states s and 
s'.  Substitute the data from Equations (4.6) into the right side of Equation (4.8), which 
is consistent if 
Ah  (S)/h  (s)  =  1r(s)/Tr(s').  (4.9) 
If we substitute from Equation (4.9), Equation (4.7) must hold because of the first-order 1020  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
condition for the market game F, 
aUh(XIh)/aXh  EZkh  q'k LE 
k=n  b] 
2  kh  JkL 
n 
q  bJ  (4.10)  duh(x)ldXh  Eksh  k  Ek=1  k  L54h  bk  Ek=l  Kk 
Thus 5 e  S  defined by Equations  (4.6) is an interior Nash  equilibrium for F(P).  Since 
we have Xh(S)  =Xh(S')  for s, s'=  1,...,  r and h = 1,...,  n, 5f is also a non-sunspot Nash 
equilibrium for the securities game F(P). 
A careful reading of the proof of Proposition  (4.5) shows that the Nash equilibria 
to  F reappear as the non-sunspot  Nash  equilibria to  F(P).  (Example  (5.7) shows that 
the converse is not true, which contrasts with the competitive  case with convexity  and 
symmetric information.) 
If  endowments  are Pareto optimal,  then  there are no  sunspot  Nash  equilibria to 
F(P).  If the probability mechanism P along with the signalling devices Ih are nondegener- 
ate, then we  have for endowments  which  are not  Pareto-optimal that there must exist 
sunspot Nash equilibria to F(P).  These ideas are formalized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.11.  (a)  Let the endowment vector w E RIn+  in the market game F  be 
Pareto-optimal. Then there is no sunspot Nash  equilibrium  to the corresponding  securities 
game F(P).  (b)  Let the endowment vector w E Rf+?  in the market game F be not Pareto- 
optimal. Let there be a common coarsening of the information  partitions Ih which contains 
(at least) two elements. Then there is a sunspot Nash equilibrium  5-  E S to the corresponding 
securities game F(P). 
Proof.  (a)  Assume that w is Pareto-optimal in F.  Clearly, then  w is also  Pareto- 
optimal  in  F(P).  Assume  that x  (,  ...,h,...  ,Xn  )  is  a sunspot  Nash  equilibrium 
allocation  in F(P).  Let P" be the 5-th element of h's information partition.  Because of 
individual rationality, we have 
ZSEPh  Prob (s I  Ph)uh  (xh  (s))-Uh  (wh) 
Multiplying both sides by Prob (Ph)  and summing over 8 yields 
Vh(X)  =Z  lr(S)Uh(Xh(S))  Vh(wh,  *,  h)  =  Uh(wh) 
for h =  1,...,  n.  Because  of the strict concavity  of  uh and the fact that x  is a sunspot 
Nash equilibria allocation, we can find a certainty allocation x = (xl,  . . . , x>,,  ..  , xn) such 
that  Uh(Xh)  Uh  h()h)  for  h =1,...,n  with  at  least  one  strict inequality.  We  have  a 
contradiction.  Thus there are no sunspot Nash equilibria for F(P). 
(b)  Assume  that w is not  Pareto-optimal in F.  Then there are at least two  Nash 
equilibria for F, o-'  =0  oE S (with the corresponding allocation x'=  -t  GE  R In+),  and an interior 
Nash  equilibrium strategy (J"  =  {((oh  )"}h--l  =  {((bh)",  (qh )")}h--l  (with the  corresponding 
allocation x"  e sVn  ).  From Proposition (2.5), we know that x' and x" are not equal. By 
hypothesis, we can partition the states of nature Ql  into two subsets, A and B, which are 
each elements of a common coarsening of the Ih.  We have A u B = Ql,  A n  B = 0,  A  0, 
and B ? 0.  We construct the sunspot Nash equilibrium 6r  for the securities game F(P) 
from these two  Nash  equilibria of the market game F as follows:  (bh(s)  =0,  h(s)  =0, 
b(s)  = q0  h (S)=O)  for  s E A,  h=1,...,  n  and  i = 1, . . .,  1; and  (b  (s)  =  (bh)"/  q^(s)= 
(qh)//  bs(s)  =  0  cr(S)  =  0 for s E B, h =  1, . . .,  n and i = 1, . . .,  1, where (bh)" and (qh)// 
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The strategy cr  E S is clearly a sunspot Nash equilibrium for the securities game r(P).  I 
The sunspot  Nash  equilibrium allocation  x  constructed in  Proposition (4.10)  is a 
lottery over (certainty) Nash  equilibria from the underlying market game r.8  As such, 
the allocation  x is also a correlated equilibrium allocation to the market game r.  Next 
we  show that a correlated equilibrium to r is always a Nash  equilibrium to  P(P)  for 
some probability space P. 
Proposition 4.12.  Let x E 1r+  be a correlated-equilibrium  allocation for  the market 
game r, where the  probability-signalling  mechanism is given by Q, {I-(s)},",  and {Ih}'h_`n 
Then x Ec  Rr  is also a Nash-equilibrium allocation to the securities game r(P)  generated 
by r,  fQ,  {r(S)}sr  and  {Ih}h=1 
Proof.  Let cr  =  {crh}h  E S be the correlated equilibrium corresponding to xs. Define 
SES  by bh(s)=bh(s),  qh(s)=4h(s),  bhm(s)=0, and,  q4(s)=0  for h=1,...,n  and s= 
1,...,  r. Then  re S  is clearly a pure-strategy Nash  equilibrium to the securities game 
r(P)  which supports the allocation  x. 
Those sunspot equilibria in which the securities market is closed  are equivalent to 
correlated equilibria and hence equivalent to Bayes-rational equilibria.  In this case, we 
can think of the-  market uncertainty as being endogenous  (even though we might not be 
able to identify  how beliefs  become  correlated).  Can sunspot equilibria with open and 
active securities  markets also  fit the  Bayes-rational-equilibrium interpretation?  In the 
securities game, consumers actively trade securities that explicitly depend on the realiz- 
ation of  sunspot  activity, so  the randomizing device  must be  exogenous.  It would  be 
worthwhile to investigate securities markets which do not explicitly depend on sunspots. 
For example, we might allow for more realistic securities whose returns depend on spot 
market prices.  If spot market prices depend  on sunspots, then "option markets" allow 
income transfers across states of nature, without the neeed for an exogenous, identifiable 
randomizing device.  We would  then have a sunspot  equilibrium with markets created 
for partial hedging against the effects of market uncertainty; however, no consumer would 
be required to understand the "ultimate source" of this uncertainty. 
5.  EXAMPLES 
This section is devoted to numerical and other examples.  We begin by computing some 
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibria to the market game F.  It is easy to find other correlated 
equilibria to  F (and  hence  (pure-strategy) Nash  equilibria to  F(P))  which  are simple 
randomizations over the Nash  equilibria to F.  Our more  interesting examples involve 
either (a) transfers  of income across states of nature which generate sunspot Nash equilibria 
to the securities game F(P)  that are not correlated equilibria to the underlying certainty 
market game F, or (b)  asymmetric information which generates correlated equilibria for 
the market game F which are not achievable with symmetric information. 
We begin with examples  of  Nash equilibria in a market game r.  These computed 
solutions will be used repeatedly in the sequel. 
8.  It is a lottery over an interior NE  and a closed-market NE.  We know from Peck, Shell, and Spear 
(1989, especially  Section 5) that multiplicity of interior NE to F is generic.  Hence, generically it is possible to 
construct sunspot Nash equilibria to the securities game which are lotteries over interior NE to the market game. 1022  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Example 5.1.  Let there be two  consumers and two  commodities.  The following 
data about consumer preferences and endowments complete the description of the market 
game  F:  Uh (Xh,  xh)  = logx+logx  for  h=1,2  and  co1=(C),C)=(80,20);  w22= 
(w1,  X)2  =  (20,80). 
Solution  1  to Example  (5.1).  The  example  is  symmetric.  Hence,  if  each  of  the 
consumers offers 100 percent of his endowments for sale, we have the symmetric interior 
Nash  equilibrium to  F displayed  below.  This is a "thick-market" solution.  Trading is 
substantial,  but  since  this  game  is  neither  cooperative  nor  perfectly  competitive,  the 
allocation of consumption goods  is still far from Pareto-optimal. 
Solution  1 to the 2 x 2 game  F of Example (5.1):  Each consumer offers 100% of his endowments. 
ql  b,  Xl  q2  b2  X-2 
Commodity  1  80 0000  0 3333  66-6667  20-0000  0 1667  33-3333 
Commodity 2  20-0000  0-1667  33-3333  80-0000  03333  66-6667 
Solution 2 to Example (5.1).  The Nash equilibrium is interior, but the symmetry is 
broken.  Consumer 1 offers 100% of his endowments, but Consumer 2 offers only 25%. 
Markets are thin relative to  those  in  Solution  1.  Each consumer is worse off than in 
Solution  1. 
Solution  2  to the 2x2  game F of Example  (5.1): Consumer  1 offers 100%  of his endowments: 
Consumer  2 offers  25%  of his endowments. 
q,  b,  xI  q2  b2  x2 
Commodity  1  80-0000  0-6836  74-2236  5 0000  0-0992  25-7764 
Commodity 2  20-0000  0.1618  29-7970  20-0000  0 0554  70-2029 
The following is an example of a securities game F(P)  which is based on the market 
game F described in Example (5.1). 
Example 5.2.  Let F be described by Example (5.1).  Let there be two states fl  {a,  ,3} 
and assume that the extrinsic random variable s obeys the probability law r(a)  = ,r(,)  = 
1/2.  Let  Ih  (h = 1, 2) be the finest partition of Ql  = {a, ,8}.  Hence,  signals are perfectly 
correlated.  Let F(P)  be the corresponding securities game defined by the market game 
F and  the  probability  space  P = (fQ, x,  I). 
Next  we compute two sunspot  Nash  equilibria for F.  The allocation  of resources 
varies across states of nature as market thickness varies.  These solutions  establish: (a) 
Some  sunspot  Nash  equilibria to  F(P)  are interior; others are not.  (b)  Some sunspot 
Nash  equilibrium allocations  to  F(P)  are also  correlated equilibrium allocations  to  F; 
others are not. 
Solution 1 to Example (5.2).  The securities markets are closed.  Hence, this solution 
can be taken as a lottery over interior Nash-equilibrium solutions (1) and (2) (to Example 
(5.1)) in the market game F.  This solution is a sunspot Nash equilibrium to F(P)  which 
is not interior.  The corresponding sunspot Nash equilibrium allocation to F(P)  is also 
a correlated-equilibrium allocation to the market game F. PECK  &  SHELL  MARKET  UNCERTAINTY  1023 
Solution  1 to the game  F(P)  defined in Example (5.2):  Consumer 2  reduces his offers to 25% in 
state 18. The securities markets are closed. 
State a  State /3 
Commodity  1  Commodity 2  Security  Commodity 1  Commodity 2  Security 
b,  0-3333  0-1667  0  0-6836  0-1618  0 
q,  80-0000  20-0000  0  80-0000  20-0000  0 
xI  66-6667  33-3333  74-2236  29-7970 
b2  0-1667  0 3333  0  0-0992  0-0554  0 
q2  20-0000  80-0000  0  5-0000  20-0000  0 
x2  33-3333  66&6667  25-7764  70-2029 
Solution 2 to Example (5.2).  In Solution 2, the securities markets are open and net 
securities purchases are non-zero.  The price of the a-security in terms of the ,X-security 
is 
(116.3231 + 116*3031)/(100+  100)  -  1*39. 
(83*6768+83*6968)/(100+  100) 
Consumer  l's  purchases  of  the  a-security  (or  better,  a-money)  are 
200[(116*3231)/(116*3231+116*3031)]=100*0086  units.  His  net  purchases  of  the  a- 
money  are hence  0-0086 units.  Consumer l's  bids  for commodities  in state a  sum to 
0-5087 state-a  dollars, of which 0-0086 state-a  dollars (amounting to 1P7  percent of the 
total)  are financed by his purchases of  a-money  in the securities market.  Consumer 1 
transfers income into state a, while consumer 2 transfers income into state ,3. Consumer 
1 seeks commodity 2 in state ,3, but Consumer 2 offers little of this commodity.  Hence 
Consumer 1 parts with commodity 1 in state X  in exchange for state-,3 money, a substantial 
portion of which he then exchanges  for state-a  money.  The state-a  money is used to 
finance his purchases of commodities in state a. 
Compare Solutions (1) and (2) (Example 5.2). With open securities markets (Solution 
1), Consumer  1 increases his consumption  of both commodities  in  (the good  state)  a 
and reduces his consumption  of both commodities in (the bad state)  X3. 
Solution 2 to the Game F(P)  defined in Example (5.2):  Consumer 2 reduces his offers to 25% in 
State /3.  The securities markets are open, and net purchases of securities are nonzero. 
State a  State A3 
Commodity  1  Commodity 2  Security  Commodity  1  Commodity 2  Security 
A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
b,  003376  041710  116-3231  0-6741  0-1586  83-6768 
q,  80-0000  20-0000  100 0000  80-0000  20-0000  100-0000 
xI  67-5204  34 1981  73-3364  29-0214 
b2  001624  0-3290  116-3031  0-1072  0-0600  83-6968 
q2  20-0000  80-0000  100 0000  5 0000  20-0000  100 0000 
x2  32-4796  65-8019  26-6636  70-9786 
Solution  2  is  especially  noteworthy.  It  is  an  interior sunspot  Nash  equilibrium 
solution  to  r  with  open  and  active  securities  markets.  Hence  this  solution  cannot  be 
considered to be a lottery over Nash-equilibrium solutions to r.  In the next lemma, we 1024  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
establish that the sunspot Nash equilibrium displayed in Solution 2 is not a correlated- 
equilibrium allocation to the corresponding market game r. 
In what follows, we use Solution 2 to Example (5.2) to establish that for some market 
game r  and some probability law P, the set of correlated equilibrium allocations to r  is 
a proper subset of the set of  pure strategy Nash  equilibrium allocations  to r(P).  The 
basic idea is that the securities game allows income to be transferred across states, but 
the self-enforcing nature of correlated equilibrium in r  excludes income transfer across 
states. 
Lemma 5.3.  It is not always the case that a pure-strategy  Nash equilibrium  allocation 
for  the securities game  r(p)  is a  correlated-equilibrium  allocation for  the corresponding 
market game  r  based on the probability law P. 
Proof.  We will be considering the sunspot Nash-equilibrium allocation to Example 
(5.2) which is presented in Solution 2 and the state space fl = {a,  ,3}.  We need to show 
that x = ((67X5204, 34X1981,  73X3364,  39X0214), (32X4796,  65X8019,  26X6636,  70 9786))  is 
not a correlated-equilibrium allocation to the market game r defined in Example (5.1). 
Assume the  contrary, i.e. that x  is a correlated-equilibrium allocation  to r.  If neither 
player  could  distinguish  between  state  a  and  state  ,3, the  information-measurability 
assumption would imply that the correlated-equilibrium allocation would be independent 
of the state of nature.  This is not the case for the allocation x.  If one player could not 
recognize the difference between  states, the other player's best response would lead to 
an allocation  independent of states.  Hence we have shown that each of the two players 
can see sunspots: neither is blind to solar activity. 
Tildes  indicate  correlated  strategies and  outcomes  for  r.  Given  the  strategy of 
consumer k, we have from Conditions (2.1)-(2.2)  that the frontier of consumer h's budget 
set in  (Xh(S),  x2(s))-space  is given by the intersection of the equation defined by 
bk' (s)(&ch  1-h(s))  b2k(S)(c&  h-  h()  0  (5.4) 
4  + 41  (s) -h(S)  2 _-2h(s) + q2(s) 
and the positive orthant, where h $ k.  If Mr. h is optimizing, it is also the case that this 
budget frontier is tangent to his indifference curve at the consumption point, which yields 
Xh(S)  4k(s)bk(S)  jCh_  Xh()  qk( 
Xh(S)  -k(s)bk(s)  ch_-  Xh(s)  +  kl(s) 
for  s = a, ,3, as  a consequence  of  the utility-function  specification  in  (5.1).  Let h = 2, 
k =  1, and s = a.  Combining Equations (5.4) and (5.5), setting x2(a)  equal to  A2(a), and 
substituting numerical values for  A2(a)  and  02 yields 
14K1981  65-8019 [  q(a)  _(a)_-_12-4796_ 
12A4796  32-4796 L  2 (a)+  141981JL  41(a) 
From the  definition  of  the  strategy set S1, we  have  2  (a )<20-  co2.  Substituting into 
Equation (5.6) yields 
1-  12A4796> 14 1981  32-4796  34 1981 
I1  12*4796  65*8019  20 
We have q1  (12-4796/0-03977) > 300, which is a contradiction to the requirement that PECK  & SHELL  MARKET  UNCERTAINTY  1025 
q  80.  The allocation x is not a correlated-equilibrium allocation9 for the market game 
F.  11 
The driving force of this example is income transfer across states of nature. Informa- 
tion in this example (and the other computed examples) is symmetric across consumers. 
In the next example, we construct (but do not compute) a non-trivial correlated equilibrium 
driven by asymmetric information. 
Example  5.7.  (Non-trivial  Correlated  Equilibrium):  We  construct  a  correlated 
equilibrium to the market game r in which the allocation is neither a Nash equilibrium 
nor a simple randomization over Nash equilibria.  It is a non-sunspot equilibrium which 
is not equivalent to a NE from the certainty market game. 
Consider first the market game Fn based on n consumers, n _ 2, and l commodities, 
_12.  We  know  from  Proposition  (2.6)  that  there  is  an  interior pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium o-  =  {(bh,  qh)}h=I  E $+l+  with the corresponding allocation x  =  {Xh}  +.  E 
Let  o'={(bh,qh)}1h  =j  be  the  strategy defined by  b  =Mbh  and  qh=qh  where  M  is  a 
positive  scalar.  We  know  from  Equations  (2.1)  and  (2.2)  that  the  budget  set  is 
homogeneous  of  degree  zero  in  the  bids  b.  Hence  o-' is  also  a  pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium for Fn. The equilibrium allocation corresponding to oc',  call it x', is also an 
equilibrium allocation corresponding to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium a. 
Introduce two states of nature, s = a, /8. Assume that each of the n consumers can 
distinguish between  a  and /3,  i.e.  Ih  is the finest partition of fl = {a, f8} for h = 1, . . .,  n. 
(We can define a  trivial correlated equilibrium for  n" by randomizing over o- and ur'. 
Bids and the general price level in state ,8 would be M times those in state a.  Consumption 
is unaffected by sunspots, although consumers must be alert to price level changes caused 
by sunspots.) 
Next  introduce a new  consumer, Mr. (n + 1), and create from r  the new market 
game  rF+1. Choose  the  preferences  and  endowments  of  Mr. (n +1)  so  that his  best 
response in rf+l  to strategies of the others given by cr would involve some non-zero net 
trades. Assume that Mr. (n + 1) cannot recognize the difference between state a and state 
,3, so  that  I,+,  is  the  coarsest  partition of  Ql. Define  5T E4I(n+1)  by  bh(a)  =  bh,  and 
qh(a)  =  qh,  bh(3  =  Mbh=bh,  and  q-(/3)  =  qh =  q  for  h=  1,...,  n,  and  bn+1(a) = 0, 
4n+1(a) =0,  bn+(/3) =0,  and q4n+?(8)  =0.  We claim that for suitable values for M  and 
ir(a),  05 is  a  correlated  equilibrium  to  rF+1 with  an  allocation  given  by  x = 
(X1  ...  , Xn,  wOn+1; X1  ...  , Xn,  w?+l)  E  snl+n+1)-  Hence in both states of nature, consumer 
h, h =  1, .. .,  n, consumes in the correlated equilibrium to rFn+ the same amounts as he 
does in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to rF. Consumer (n + 1) consumes his endow- 
ments in the two states.  The allocation x does not depend on sunspots, yet it is not based 
on  any  pure-strategy Nash  equilibrium to  rn+1.  That  is,  (xi,...  ,  xn,  wOn+l) is  not  a 
pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium  allocation  to  rfn+l  (even though  (xI,...  , xn) is a pure- 
strategy Nash equilibrium to rn). 
Before we  formally state or prove our claim, we provide a heuristic argument.  If 
the first n players were playing the pure strategy o- (or even the pure strategy c'),  Mr. 
9.  We believe  that the allocation  of  Solution 2 is not a correlated equilibrium allocation  for any state 
space,  information structure, and probabilities.  We have not yet found  a proof for this conjecture.  Forges 
(1990) constructs a closed-market sunspot equilibrium to r(P)  where, for state a, some consumer is below his 
individually rational utility level.  This clearly cannot be a correlated equilibrium allocation  for any P.  Also, 
for an economy with indivisibilities in consumption (based on the model of Shell and Wright (1989)), one can 
easily construct a sunspot equilibrium that yields utilities different from the utilities achievable in any correlated 
equilibrium. 1026  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
(n + 1) would respond with a strategy which would yield him non-zero net trades. Neither 
oC  nor  '  can form the basis for a Nash-equilibrium strategy for rf+l.  Because Mr. (n + 1) 
cannot distinguish between a  and ,3, his randomized strategy must be degenerate in that 
it is constant across states.  Because of the extreme bankruptcy penalty, he will not risk 
bankruptcy in either state.  His bids are bounded from above in order to avoid bankruptcy 
originating from state  a.  State ,3 is the  inflationary state.  If consumer  (n +1)  makes 
positive bids, they would have to be small to avoid state-a  bankruptcy. This means that 
he would make substantial offers with meagre state-,3 bids (relative to the state ,3 bids 
of  others).  This would  lead to  a loss  in utility on his state ,3 trades which cannot be 
offset by the gains from his state-a trades if the probability i(a)  is sufficiently small and 
the inflation rate M is sufficiently large. 
Claim 5.8.  For some positive scalar M and some probability  ITr(a)  with 0 < ITr(a)  < 1, 
the strategy vector  C defined in Example (5.7) is a correlated  equilibrium  to the market  game 
rn+I. 
Proof of Claim.  Mr. (n + 1) is blind to sunspot activity, so he maximizes 
[  i  i  + ~bn+l  E,=l  qk] 
bJ=Ibin,'  b  +1  +1  E  nk.I 
(a)u)n+in.  = I, &  +  n+1  n+l  +  n  (5.1) 
r(bi  g  fb  +  1  (5b1 
subject to 
qj  I  I 
na  n1vl  b 
+1 
(5.9)  Z1=l  bn+l=Zj=I  n+I7  k=Ik-L 
and 
Choose  the  poitive  scalar  E  sotaI  xrsin(.1)i  oiiefrj  n1,  n 
.~k  (.  l  an 
Suppose there is some  i for which btha> 0.  Then the first-order condition 
(5.9).  offerrom  (5.1  we  h1)ave thatj+  for  j  every scalar .  thee  .  is  apadir (t(e  Mssuc 
that foere  i(  n+I  (a1)i  ie 
1rxn+(a)-~  ()~~~Lx+  /)  Lbk  1+M  +l b I 
m(E 
n+I 
b+1  *  12 
k = I_  _  _  I  I  _k_ 
X ~~-  +1(a  0  2[;=  (5.12) 
Cho) Fose  the1)  poiiehaettfoevr  scalar  Eotaepeso  (512  is positie  foa ar  j  (,..a,  1, andh 
chooseo iTh  reaining  parandMetr so  twehate  0<  n+I(a)  <  E()adM.  ol.Teeoe 
alNfersfoxrtn+)aezr,q"+  0fr  1..  .Ti  contradict  the  assumption 
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choosing  M>  0 sufficiently large and i(ac)>  0 sufficiently small, we have ensured that 
Mr. (n + 1)'s best response  is zero bids,  zero  offers, and hence  zero trade.  Since  Mr. 
(n +1)  bids and offers zero, the first n consumers will by construction be content with 
playing o- in state a  and o-' in state ,3. We have constructed a correlated equilibrium to 
F`+l  driven  by  asymmetric  information.  11 
The strategy C is a non-trivial correlated equilibrium to rf+l  in which the asymmetry 
of  information is essential.  But this correlated equilibrium has a very special feature: 
Mr. (n + 1), who is blind to sunspots, stays out of thee  market for fear of bankruptcy in 
the deflationary state, a.  According to Definition (4.4), this equilibrium is a non-sunspot 
equilibrium, even though  it could  not arise without extrinsic uncertainty.  We are not 
aware of  another example  of an equilibrium in which the allocation  is independent of 
sunspots,  yet is not an equilibrium for the deterministic economy.  Andreu Mas-Colell 
has suggested that a non-trivial sunspot equilibrium should be one in which, with positive 
probability, the ex post realization is not an equilibrium of the deterministic economy. 
Under this alternative definition, the equilibrium of Example (5.7) would be considered 
a non-trivial sunspot equilibrium. 
Interior correlated equilibria are not easy to construct in this model because of the 
severe specification of the bankruptcy rule: if the consumer risks bankruptcy in any state 
he is severely punished in all states.  (The proper correlated equilibrium exhibited in the 
Aumann-Peck-Shell  (forthcoming)  note  is relatively easy to  construct, because in that 
example the use of only commodity money completely obviates the bankruptcy problem.) 
A more realistic (less severe) bankruptcy rule would limit punishments to states in which 
violation of the budget constraint is actually observed and would make such punishments 
proportional to the extent of bankruptcy. We are confident that in such a setting proper 
correlated  equilibria would  be  frequently  encountered  and  robust to  changes  in  the 
parameters. 
When information is symmetric, the bankruptcy punishment can be weakened without 
changing the set of equilibria, because each player knows the equilibrium actions of the 
others.  There is  no  need  to  forego  a trade that  is  desired  in  one  state but leads  to 
bankruptcy in another state.  In this sense, our examples of sunspot equilibria are quite 
robust.  With asymmetric information, the  sunspot  equilibria and correlated equilibria 
will be sensitive to the bankruptcy rule, but the comparison between the two solution 
concepts is robust.  Because markets can be endogenously closed, correlated-equilibrium 
allocations  to  F  (with  a  different bankruptcy rule)  will  be  sunspot  Nash-equilibrium 
allocations to F(P)  (with the new bankruptcy rule).  There will also be the possibility of 
sunspot-equilibrium allocations,  involving transfers of income across states, that are not 
correlated-equilibrium allocations.  The only result in the present paper that is sensitive 
to the bankruptcy rule is Example (5.7). 
We conclude with some remarks  on the Cournotian foundations of incomplete-market 
competitive equilibrium and sunspot competitive equilibrium.10 
6.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS  ON  REPLICATIONS,  INCOMPLETE  MARKETS, 
AND  SUNSPOTS 
As  the  economy  becomes  large  through  replication,  the  interior NE  to  F  approach 
competitive equilibrium.  Any spectrum of open and closed markets is self-justifying.  In 
10. See  Mas-Colell  (1982).  See also  Maskin and Tirole (1987),  Peck and Shell  (1985, Section 4),  and 
Aumann, Peck, and Shell (forthcoming).  Compare with Peck and Shell (1990). 1028  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
this  simple  way,  the  market-game model  provides  an  endogenous  theory  of  market 
incompleteness. 
For the symmetric  information case, as the economy becomes large the set of interior 
sunspot equilibria vanishes, but some sunspot equilibria in which some markets are closed 
will remain.  For example, the markets for commodity  1 in state a  and commodity 2 in 
state ,3 might be (endogenously)  closed.  Sunspots will then very likely matter, and if the 
securities market is open,  consumers will typically be transferring income across states 
of nature.  We can interpret the limit of our model in which some markets are closed as 
a  competitive,  incomplete-markets  model.  (See,  e.g.  Balasko  and  Cass  (1989)  and 
Geanakoplos  and Mas-Colell  (1989), where the emphasis is, however, on complete spot 
commodity markets and incomplete securities markets.) 
When information is  asymmetric, the picture is completely  changed.  Even as the 
economy  is made large through replication, some  interior proper correlated equilibria 
persist.  For instance,  the correlated-equilibrium allocation  in  Example  (5.7)  does  not 
tend to  a competitive  allocation  as the economy  is replicated.  In Aumann, Peck, and 
Shell  (forthcoming),  a  two-commodity  variant  of  F  is  used  in  which  bankruptcy is 
impossible.  A family of correlated equilibria is constructed with the property that as the 
number of consumers approaches infinity, significant uncertainty about allocations per- 
sists.  The realized allocation  is never a competitive-equilibrium allocation  in this limit 
economy. 
In the competitive economy, consumers take prices (of commodities traded on open 
markets) as given.  In large market games,  consumers have  (little  or) no  influence on 
prices, but they do not take prices as given.  Since the price is determined by the action 
of the other consumers, a consumer might make his bids and offers without knowing the 
bids and offers of the other consumers.  That is, he might have to make his move without 
knowing prices.  Asymmetric information is crucial to this distinction.  When information 
is symmetric, each consumer knows the equilibrium bids and offers of the other consumers, 
so he knows the equilibrium prices. 
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